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ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR
UNINTENTIONAL CRIMES: REMAINING
WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF INTENT
Audrey Rogers*
The doctrine of accomplice liability delineates when a person
may be guilty of a crime committed by someone else.' By definition,
accomplice liability is derivative in nature since the actor is removed
from direct involvement in the commission of the crime.2 Because of
this lack of direct involvement, the classic model of accomplice liabil-
ity requires that an accomplice intends to promote or facilitate the
commission of an offense and, consequently with this intent, aids the
principal actor? This intent requirement ensures that the accomplice
has a stake in the principal's acts; in effect, the accomplice makes the
acts his or her own. Since the accomplice's conscious objective is that
the underlying crime be committed, and thus aids in its commission,
it is fair to hold the accomplice as criminally culpable as the principal.
The extent to which a person may be an accomplice to an unin-
tentional crime is an area that has received relatively little judicial or
scholarly examination.5 The predominant reason for this dearth of
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. I wish to
thank Professor Donald L. Doernberg for his insightful comments and advice,
and my research assistant, Kelly Welch, for her help in preparing this Article. I
also thank John, Erica, and David Furfaro for their patience and support.
1. This Article uses the terms "accomplice liability" and "complicity" to de-
scribe instances where a party-the secondary actor-is found criminally re-
sponsible for the acts of another, the primary actor or principal.
2. See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
3. See infra Part I.B..
4. This Article uses the term "unintentional" to cover crimes requiring a
mental state of something less than intent or knowledge. Courts, however,
sometimes refer to such crimes simply as "unintended." See, e.g., State v. Satern,
516 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1994). In fact, "unintended" crimes typically connote
situations where the principal commits offenses other than what the accomplice
intended. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
ambiguity raised by the duality of the term "unintentional," see infra notes 36-37
and accompanying text.
5. Professor Joshua Dressler noted the scarcity of scholarly commentary on
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attention appears to be simply that an intrinsic component of classic
mala in se crimes is intent. Premeditated murders, rapes, and robber-
ies are not performed unintentionally. Perhaps as a result of the doc-
trinal insistence on intent, some courts view the concept of intending
to aid in the commission of an unintentional crime as oxymoronic.
Yet situations exist where imposing accomplice liability on a secon-
dary actor is appropriate. When a person intends to aid another in
performing a specific culpable act that inadvertently results in harm,
that person is as equally accountable as the principal. Indeed, a
growing number of courts have found secondary actors responsible
for another individual's unintentional crime. While some of these
cases withstand scrutiny, in many instances courts have extended cul-
pability beyond the proper reach of accomplice liability doctrine.
Two fact patterns best illustrate the problem in ascertaining the
proper scope of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes. In the
first example, an automobile passenger who is late for an appoint-
ment demands that the driver exceed the speed limit. The driver
complies, and because of the excessive speed, cannot stop in time to
avoid hitting another car that stops suddenly, and the driver of that
other car is killed. The driver and the passenger are charged with
criminally negligent homicide.6 Here, the passenger fits into the
paradigm of accomplice liability because he or she intended that the
driver engage in the specific act that resulted in the unintentional
death. The mens rea requirement for accomplice liability is satisfied
because, analogous to requiring that the accomplice intend to pro-
mote or facilitate the commission of the offense, here the accomplice
intended to promote or facilitate the act underlying the unintentional
offense.7 That the crime charged is founded on criminal negligence is
irrelevant in assessing the secondary actor's culpability.
accomplice liability in general in his excellent article on the topic. See Joshua
Dressler, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability:
New Solutions to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91 (1985). See generally
WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 6.7(e), at 584-86
(2d ed. 1986) (advocating that one who encourages or assists another to engage
in negligent conduct which results in an unintentional crime be held liable under
the theory of criminal negligence rather than accomplice liability); Sanford H.
Kadish, Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation of Doctrine,
73 CAL. L. REv. 323 (1985) (discussing the complicity doctrine and its relation-
ship to causation and the rules of disability).
6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(4) (now § 2.06(4)) commentary at 34
(Tentative Draft No. 1,1953).
7. Some commentators advocate directly assessing the secondary actor's cul-
pability under causation principles. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at 585; in-
fra note 78 (comparing Professors LaFave and Scott's position regarding causation
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In the second example, a car owner gives a person the keys to his
or her car, knowing that person is intoxicated. The intoxicated driver
falls asleep at the wheel, loses control of the car and kills a pedes-
trian. The driver and the owner are charged with reckless man-
slaughter. In this situation, it is more problematic to find the owner
guilty as the driver's accomplice. While one could say that the owner
intended to aid the principal's act of driving while intoxicated, it is
much less clear that the owner intended that the driver fall asleep and
lose control of the car.' Applying accomplice liability here raises
troubling questions about whether the complicity doctrine is being
stretched beyond its proper limits merely to find a means of punish-
ing the owner. This doctrinal contortion creates a risk of excessive
punishment and subverts the purpose of derivative liability as a
means of punishing a secondary actor only upon proof that the sec-
ondary actor has associated himself or herself with the principal's
culpable conduct.
This Article addresses the issue of the proper extent of a secon-
dary actor's culpability for unintentional crimes committed by an-
other. Part I reviews accomplice liability and its mens rea require-
ments generally. Part II discusses the history of the application of
complicity theory to unintentional crimes. Part III examines whether
accomplice liability for unintentional crimes is proper, and concludes
that in keeping with complicity's doctrinal requirements, liability is
appropriate only when the secondary actor has the intent to aid in the
commission of the culpable act that results in unplanned harm. It
evaluates whether the various categories of accomplice statutes suf-
ficiently delineate the intent requirement of accomplice liability for
unintentional crimes. In addition, Part III suggests that courts gen-
erally assess liability for unintentional crimes indiscriminately be-
cause they misunderstand the intent requirements of accomplice li-
ability.
I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
A. The Nature of Accomplice Liability
Criminal law rests on societal demands that certain conduct be
condemned. From the earliest days of civilized society, aiding some-
one in the commission of a criminal act with the intent that a crime
with actual case law).
& See Kadish, supra note 5, at 348.
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be committed has been deemed blameworthy and deserving of pun-
ishment.9 Accomplice liability is a means of holding a person liable
for crimes committed by another; complicity is not a separate or dis-
tinct crime."0 Accomplice liability is inherently derivative because the
accomplice or secondary actor does not directly perform the acts con-
stituting the substantive crime. Consider, for example, a person who
9. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another,
43 HARV. L. REv. 689, 694-701 (1930). Thus, as early as 1329, the Anglo-Saxon
law recognized that "all those who come in company to a certain place with a
common consent where a wrong is done, whether homicide or robbery or other
trespass, each one shall be held as principal actor, although he was standing by
and did no wrongful act." Id. at 696 n.31.
At common law, parties to a crime were categorized in four ways: "(1)
principal in the first degree; (2) principal in the second degree; (3) accessory be-
fore the fact; and (4) accessory after the fact." LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5,
at 569. For a discussion of the numerous procedural dificulties with these cate-
gories, see Dressler, supra note 5, at 94-95. As a result of legislative reform, leg-
islators have abolished the distinctions among the first three categories, with sec-
ond degree principals and accessories before the fact sharing the single
classification of "accomplice". See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, at 574-75.
The fourth, accessory after the fact, has remained a separate category in recogni-
tion that the person so classified is not actually a participant in the crime; rather,
the individual has acted in some way to obstruct justice. See id. at 569.
10. See Dressler, supra note 5, at 96-98.
11. Some disagreement exists between commentators as to the nature of ac-
complice liability vis-4-vis the principal. There is no doubt that at early common
law an accomplice's liability was "derived" from the principal's liability, so that if
the principal could not be tried for the crime, the accomplice likewise was un-
convictable. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 340; Sayre, supra note 9, at 695. Mod-
em complicity rules no longer predicate an accomplice's liability upon the con-
viction of the principal. See, e.g., Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10 (1980)
(holding that the aider or abettor may be properly convicted even after acquittal
of the named principal); Jeter v. State, 274 A.2d 337, 338 (Md. 1971) (holding
that "subsequent acquittal of a principal in the first degree does not affect the
trial or conviction of a principal in the second degree"); People v. Kief, 27 N.E.
556 (N.Y. 1891) (stating the question of one defendant's guilt is an independent
issue to be tried alone and may not turn upon the establishment of the other's
guilt). See generally Kadish, supra note 5, at 34042 (discussing the legal conse-
quences-that an accomplice can be liable even when the principal is acquitted-
of the evolution of accomplice liability from being grounded in principal's guilt to
being grounded in the causation doctrine); Sayre, supra note 9, at 695
(commenting that after 1848 it was "possible to indict, try, convict and punish an
accessory before the fact 'in all respects as if he were a principal felon"'). There-
fore, while it is still essential that a crime be committed for accomplice liability to
exist, see, e.g., United States v. Ruffin, 613 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1979), the state
may establish the accomplice's culpability without first obtaining a conviction
against the principal as long as the state can establish the principal's guilt at the
accomplice's trial. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 94 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. Ct. App. 1956);
Maddox v. Commonwealth, 349 S.W.2d 686 (Ky. 1960); State v. Howes, 432 A.2d
419 (Me. 1981). As Professor Kadish states, "[w]hat grounds the liability of the
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acts as a lookout in a robbery. The lookout's actions do not techni-
cally fulfill the definition of robbery-forcible taking of the property
of another-because the lookout did not take anything from the vic-
tim. Society, however, demands that the lookout be held accountable
for his or her actions;12 therefore, the doctrine of accomplice liability
creates the means for finding the accomplice in violation of the stat-
ute.
The reasons for imposing culpability upon a secondary actor
stem from an innate sense of justice: one who willingly participates
or aids in the commission of a crime deserves punishment. The inter-
relationship between blame and punishment is the foundation of all
criminal law and justifies the doctrine of accomplice liability.13 Some
accomplice is the liability of the principal at the time he acted, even though it was
not and could [not] ... be imposed upon him." Kadish, supra note 5, at 340-41
(emphasis added).
Moreover, the accomplice can still be convicted even though the principal is
not guilty because of some defense available to the principal. In this situation,
the courts reason that the defense is personal to the principal. See, e.g., United
States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that entrapment defense
extended only to principal); Farnsworth v. Zerbst, 98 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1938)
(stating that diplomatic immunity shielded principal only); Vaden v. State, 768
P.2d 1102 (Alaska 1989) (holding that public authority justification defense is
personal and non-transferable to principal). Additionally, modem complicity
rules permit the accomplice to be convicted of a different level of crime than the
principal. See, e.g., Pendry v. State, 367 A.2d 627 (Del. 1976) (holding that prin-
cipal's conviction for manslaughter does not prevent conviction of accomplice for
first-degree murder); State v. Walker, 843 P.2d 203 (Kan. 1992) (determining that
defendant could be properly convicted of aiding and abetting aggravated criminal
sodomy despite the principal's conviction for the lesser offense of attempted
criminal sodomy); State v. McAllister, 366 So. 2d 1340 (La. 1978) (principal's ac-
quittal of first-degree murder and subsequent conviction for manslaughter not a
bar to accessory's conviction for first-degree murder); Jones v. State, 486 A.2d
184 (Md. 1985) (convicting accomplice of first-degree murder although principal
found guilty only of second-degree murder).
Because contemporary complicity rules no longer completely link the ac-
complice's liability to the principal, some commentators stress that the accom-
plice's liability is personal and not derivative. See PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW § 6.1, at 323-24 (Aspen 1997). Other scholars, notably Professor
Kadish, stress the derivative nature of accomplice liability. See Kadish, supra
note 5, at 337-42. The issue appears to be one of semantics. Accomplice liability
is by nature derivative because the criminal actions are being committed by one
other than the accomplice. Perhaps a better term would be "indirect." Cf. id
(suggesting that the term "dependent" be used instead of "derivative").
12. Some commentators have questioned whether all accomplices should be
punished equally and instead have suggested creating a mechanism to measure
the level of the accomplice's contribution to the completed offense. See generally
Dressler, supra note 5, at 121-30 (discussing three possible ways to more fairly
allocate liability among accomplices).
13. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 329-36. Commentators have elaborated on
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measuring device is necessary to assess blame and a corresponding
level of punishment. That device is found in the intent and act 14 re-
quirements that are components of accomplice liability.
B. The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability
From its inception, accomplice liability required some concept of
intent.5 However, as Professors LaFave and Scott note, "[c]onsider-
able confusion exists as to what the accomplice's mental state must
be in order to hold him accountable for an offense committed by an-
other. ,1 6 Broadly stated, the accomplice must act with the intent to
aid in the commission of an offense.17 Courts and commentators gen-
erally agree that this definition actually involves two mens reas: first,
the moral justifications for accomplice liability. Some make an analogy to civil
rules of agency. See Dressier, supra note 5, at 109-10; Kadish, supra note 5, at
354. Under civil law, the secondary actor-the principal in civil law nomencla-
ture-is responsible for the acts of his agent, the primary actor, because he is
deemed to have directed or ratified the agent's actions. See Kadish, supra note 5,
at 354. In the criminal law setting, the primary actor-now labeled the princi-
pal-is akin to being the accomplice's delegate. The accomplice is in agreement
with the principal's actions, thereby adopting them, and the accomplice is there-
fore worthy of punishment. See Dressler, supra note 5, at 110. The agency anal-
ogy works best when the accomplice is the driving force or mastermind of the
criminal act since this most resembles the civil law principal. In other situations
where the accomplice makes less of a contribution to the crime, the agency doc-
trine is less satisfying because the element of control over the primary actor's ac-
tions is missing. See id. Agency theory is most often used to explain the basis of
conspiracy liability where all those who have formed an agreement to commit a
crime are held responsible for the criminal acts undertaken in furtherance of the
conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647 (1946).
As a further justification, punishing secondary actors also accomplishes utilitar-
ian goals of deterrence and incapacitation. See Dressler, supra note 5, at 111.
14. For a discussion of the act requirements, see LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note
5, at 576-79 and Kadish, supra note 5, at 342-46.
15. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. One explanation for requiring
proof of intent is the lack of the direct causal link between the accomplice and
the resultant harm. See Sayre, supra note 9, at 700-01. Courts and legislatures
typically judge acts as deserving of punishment by the harmful result they cause.
See Dressier, supra note 5, at 104-06. Since, by definition, the accomplice does
not "cause" any result, we must establish the accomplice's blameworthiness some
other way. Where a person intends to aid another to commit a crime, that per-
son has manifested a willingness to participate in culpable conduct, and therefore
is deserving of punishment.
16. LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 579.
17. The abolition of the common-law categories of accessorial liability, see
supra note 9, was accompanied by the enactment of accomplice liability statutes.
See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text (reviewing the various types of ac-
complice liability statutes).
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the accomplice must have the intent to aid the principal in the com-
mission of the offense; and second, the accomplice must have the
mens rea required by the underlying offense."
With intentional crimes, this dual intent requirement is uncom-
plicated because when an accomplice intends that the principal
commit the offense, he or she customarily also possesses the intent
required by the underlying offense.' 9 The matter becomes murky,
however, when the underlying offense is unintentional because it is
more difficult to pinpoint the accomplice's mens rea. To best under-
stand the tension that exists in applying accomplice liability to unin-
tentional crimes, we need to explore a number of preliminary issues.
The most controversial aspect of the mens rea requirement to
date has been with respect to the requirement that the accomplice aid
with the intent that the principal commit a crime. At common law,
the term "intent" covered two mental states: purpose and knowl-
edge.?0 Thus, a question arises as to whether a person, who aids
18. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 579-80; Kadish, supra note 5, at
349.
In fact, accomplice liability requires three mens rea inquiries: first, an ac-
complice must intentionally aid the principal's actions; second, the accomplice
must do so with the intent that the principal commit a crime; and third, the ac-
complice must possess the mens rea of the underlying crime. See Kadish, supra
note 5, at 346-49. The initial requirement of intentional aid protects those who
may recklessly render aid. Otherwise the person who leaves keys in a place
where there is a risk that a perpetrator will use them to start the principal's car to
use in a robbery would be liable for any reckless acts. See Grace E. Mueller,
Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2169, 2175
(1988) ("The question is whether [the] intent.., is directed toward the act or to-
ward the commission of a crime."). Mueller notes that the question has not
caused courts any great difficulties; they have easily found that the accomplice
must intend that the aid be directed toward conduct which the accomplice knows
to be criminal. See id. She further notes that the "proposition is so basic that
courts generally fail to mention it." Id at 2175 n.28. It becomes crucial, how-
ever, in the context of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes. See infra
Part III.
19. For example, for A to be an accomplice to P's larceny, he must not only
intentionally aid P in taking the victim's property-the first mens rea-but A
must also intend that P commit a crime-the second mens rea-and A must also
have the intent required by the larceny statute to permanently deprive V of V's
property-the third mens rea. In other words he must intentionally aid, he must
do so with the intent that P commit a crime, and he, too, must possess the mens
rea of the underlying crime. If he does not meet all three intent requirements, he
is not guilty. See Wilson v. People, 87 P.2d 5 (Colo. 1939).
20. See generally LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 216-18 ("[T]he traditional
view is that a person who acts... intends a result ... under two quite different cir-
cumstances; (1) when he consciously desires that result... ; and (2) when he knows
that that result is practically certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire
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another with knowledge that the latter is committing a crime, has the
mental state required for accomplice liability.
The archetypal case involves suppliers of goods or services who
act with the knowledge that the goods or services will be used to
commit a crime.1 Courts differ sharply over whether such knowledge
suffices to impose accomplice culpability.' In United States v. Peoni,n
may be as to that result.").
21. A parallel controversy exists as to whether knowledge or purpose is re-
quired for conspiracy. See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 709-13
(1943) (holding that intent is required but may be inferred from knowledge in
certain circumstances); United States v. Falcone, 109 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1940),
affd, 311 U.S. 205 (1940) (concluding that knowledge alone is insufficient to sus-
tain conspiracy conviction); People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 481, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 628, 634 (1967) (suggesting that knowledge will suffice to show intent for
serious crimes). See generally Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grail, Element
Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35
STAN. L. REv. 681, 751-56 (1983) (describing the analytical difficulty presented
by the elements of conspiracy).
22 Compare United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938) (holding de-
fendant was not culpable as an accomplice because he could not foresee later ac-
tions by the principle), and State v. Gladstone, 474 P.2d 274 (Wash. 1970)
(holding defendant was not guilty because his communications only suggested
another might commit a crime), with Backun v. United States, 112 F.2d 635 (4th
Cir. 1940) (holding that defendant was an accomplice because he knew the con-
templated crimes could not occur without his action).
The major arena for the purpose/knowledge controversy has been in those ju-
risdictions whose accomplice statutes are vague in their mens rea requirement.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1995) (a person is punishable as a principal if he
"willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another
would be an offense against the United States"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West
1988). Much more specificity as to the requisite mental state for an accomplice is
stated in most state complicity statutes. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, even in those states whose statutes appear to require intent,
the issue of whether knowledge will suffice has been raised. See generally Louis
Westerfield, The "Mens Rea' Requirement of Accomplice Liability in American
Criminal Law-Knowledge or Intent, 51 MIss. L.J. 155, 167-69 (1980) (outlining
the development of mens rea requirements in California for accomplice liability
and noting the strengths and weaknesses of the current approach).
23. 100 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1938). In Peoni, the defendant sold counterfeit bills
to another, who then sold the same bills to a third party. See id. at 401. All three
knew the bills were counterfeit. See id. Peoni was convicted on three counts of
possessing counterfeit money and one for conspiracy to possess it. See id. The
question considered on appeal to the Second Circuit was whether the defendant
was guilty as an accessory to the third party's possession of the counterfeit
money, based on the probability that it would pass into the hands of such a per-
son and be circulated unlawfully. See id. at 401-02. In finding that Peoni could
not be convicted as an accessory, the court looked to the traditional definitions of
accomplice liability and found that they had nothing to do with the probability
that the forbidden result would follow upon the accessory's conduct. See id. at
402. Rather, these definitions all stated that accessorial liability arose only where
the defendant purposely associated himself with the venture. See id. Since Peoni
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the Second Circuit ruled that nothing less than true purpose suffices
for accomplice liability. According to Peoni, the law requires that the
accomplice "in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he
participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, [and]
that he seek by his action to make it succeed."24 In pointed contrast,
the Fourth Circuit held that knowledge is sufficient, reasoning that
"[g]uilt as an accessory depends, not on 'having a stake' in the out-
come of the crime... [,] but on aiding and assisting the perpetrators.
... The seller may not ignore the purpose for which the purchase is
made if he is advised of that purpose ......
In an effort to reconcile the Peoni and Backun opinions, some
commentators and courts have suggested that mens rea be linked to
the seriousness of the crime and the degree of assistance the secon-
dary party gave the perpetrators." Specifically, they urge that knowl-
edge should suffice for major crimesV Other jurisdictions have codi-
fied the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code approach which
rejects the lesser standard of knowledge in favor of purpose to
had not directly associated himself with the third party, he could not be consid-
ered an accessory to that person's criminal conduct and his conviction was re-
versed. See id. at 403.
24. 1& at 402.
25. Backun, 112 F.2d at 637. In Backun, the defendant sold silverware he
knew was stolen to one Zucker, knowing that Zucker would then transport the
silverware across state lines to sell it. See id. at 636. Defendant was convicted of
transporting stolen merchandise of a value in excess of $5000 in interstate com-
merce in violation of the National Stolen Property Act. See id. On appeal, he
argued that the prosecution had not presented evidence that he had anything to
do with the transportation of the goods. See id. In finding no merit to this argu-
ment, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this was a case of "a sale of
stolen property by a guilty possessor [Backun] who knows that the buyer will
transport it in interstate commerce in violation of law and who desires to sell it
for that reason." Id. Therefore, the court held there was direct evidence of
Backun's participation in the crime. See id. at 636-38.
26. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (concluding that knowl-
edge is sufficient for crime of treason); United States v. Aponte-Suarez, 905 F.2d
483, 490-91 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that knowledge is insufficient for crime of
conspiracy to import narcotics); Graves v. Johnson, 60 N.E. 383, 383 (Mass. 1901)
(concluding that knowledge is insufficient for unlawful sale of liquor).
27. See People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 481, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628, 634
(1967). In Lauria, the court classified the seriousness of a crime according to
whether it was a felony or a misdemeanor, with knowledge sufficing for the for-
mer only. See id.; see also United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1985)
(under theory of accomplice liability, purpose required for lesser crimes, but
knowledge sufficient for major crimes). Some jurisdictions have resolved the is-
sue by enacting complicity statutes requiring only knowledge. See, e.g., WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.08.020(3)(a) (West 1988).
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promote the commission of the offense. 2u Additionally, some juris-
dictions have responded to the issue by enacting criminal facilitation
statutes that penalize knowing assistance as a separate crime, rather
than changing its complicity standards.29
Controversy also rages over the extent of the accomplice's
culpability when the perpetrator commits crimes other than that
which the accomplice intended to aid. For example, a secondary ac-
tor aids a principal in planning a bank robbery by providing the prin-
cipal with plans to the bank's security system. Unbeknownst to the
secondary actor, on the day of the robbery, the principal steals a car
to get to the bank. Although the secondary actor is clearly guilty of
bank robbery, is that actor an accomplice to the auto theft?"
Under a strict application of accomplice liability rules, the courts
should not hold the secondary actor as an accomplice because that
actor did not intend to aid in the commission of the auto theft. Some
jurisdictions, however, have held that the secondary actor is culpable
under the "natural and probable consequence" doctrine which states
that individuals may be held as accomplices for crimes they did not
intend to aid, if those crimes are the "natural and probable conse-
quence" of the crime they did intend to assist." By intending to aid
28. Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3) (currently § 2.06(3)) commen-
tary at 24-32 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1953) (advocating a mens rea standard of
knowledge), with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) commentary at 21 (Tentative
Draft No. 4, 1955) (noting that the American Law Institute disapproved a lower-
ing of the requisite mental state from purpose to knowledge). The American
Law Institute issued its Proposed Official Draft of the Model Penal Code in 1962.
It requires a mental state of purpose for accomplice liability. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
29. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1004 (West 1989); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 506.080 (Michie 1990); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 115 (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 12.1-06-02 (1985).
30. Regardless of whether A is guilty of auto theft as P's accomplice, he may
very well be guilty of the auto theft under the laws of conspiracy that tradition-
ally have found conspirators guilty of all substantive offenses a co-conspirator
commits in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328
U.S. 640, 642-43 (1946). Much of the controversy that swirls around the extent of
accomplice liability for the unintended crimes of the principal also surrounds the
extent of conspiracy liability for such crimes. See generally LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 5, at 587-90 (discussing the limits of accomplice liability).
31. See People v. Prettyman, 14 Cal. 4th 248, 926 P.2d 1013, 58 Cal. Rptr. 248
(1996) (holding that a defendant may be held criminally responsible not only for
the crime he or she intended to aid and abet, but also for any other crime that is
the natural and probable consequence of the target crime); see also People v.
Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 445, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 853 (1987) (holding that
an accomplice is liable for the natural and reasonable or probable consequences
of any act that the accomplice knowingly aided or encouraged); Chance v. State,
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the principal in the commission of one crime, the accomplices have
identified themselves with the principal and are responsible for the
foreseeable harms of their acts, regardless of whether the principal
deliberately commits a crime that the accomplices did not intend to
aid 2
Most commentators strongly oppose this doctrine as both
"incongruous and unjust" because it imposes accomplice liability
solely upon proof of foreseeability or negligence when typically a
higher degree of mens rea is required of the principal.33 The Ameri-
can Law Institute fashioned a compromise on this issue, requiring
generally that an accomplice act with purposeM but tempering this
685 A.2d 351, 357-89 (Del. 1996) (holding that an accomplice for assault could be
held responsible for unintended death of victim); People v. Cole, 625 N.E.2d 816,
820-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (holding that an acomplice can be liable for any acts in
furtherance of a common criminal design or agreement); State v. Bowman, 588
A.2d 728, 731 (Me. 1991) (holding that a reckless'or criminally negligent killing
by the principal was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's
own conduct); State v. Fillipi, 335 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Minn. 1983) (holding that
culpability rested on whether a defendant knew or reasonably could foresee the
consequences of defendant's actions). But see Bogdanov v. People, 941 P.2d 247,
251 n.8 (Colo. 1997) (finding that the Colorado General Assembly chose not to
extend accomplice liability to reasonably foreseeable crimes but rather limited
such liability to those particular crimes which the accomplice intended to pro-
mote or facilitate).
Some states have codified the "natural and probable consequence" rule in
their complicity statutes. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3205(2) (1988) ("A
person liable under subsection (1) hereof [accomplice section] is also liable for
any other crime committed in pursuance of the intended crime if reasonably
foreseeable by such person as a probable consequence of committing or attempt-
ing to commit the crime intended."); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 57(3)A
(West 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05 (West 1987).
32. See Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 442-45, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832, 851-53
(1987).
33. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 312 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). The commentary notes that "if anything the culpability level for the
accomplice should be higher than that of the principal actor, because there is
generally more ambiguity in the overt conduct engaged in by the accomplice, and
thus a higher risk of convicting the innocent." Id.; see also LAFAVE & SCOTr,
supra note 5, at 590; Dressier, supra note 6, at 97-98 (criticising the extension of
accomplice liability for unintended crimes); Kadish, supra note 5, at 351-52.
Thus, in the auto theft example, under the natural and probable conse-
quence doctrine, the accomplice would be guilty of auto theft if the accomplice
should have foreseen that the principal would steal a car as part of the bank rob-
bery; whereas, the principal would not be guilty unless the State could prove that
the principal intended to steal the car-a higher mens rea than negligence.
34. Section 2.06(3)(a) of the Model Penal Code provides, in pertinent part,
that "[a] person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an of-
fense if [he acts] ... with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission
of the offense...." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft
1361
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1351
requirement for crimes that require a particular result." For these of-
fenses, the Model Penal Code requires that the accomplice purposely
aid the principal's conduct, but only have the mens rea as to the re-
sult that is required by the crime committed. 6 The Commentary to
the Model Penal Code states that this modification was meant to ad-
dress the harshest aspects of the natural and probable consequence
doctrine.' This compromise does not affect the accomplice in the
1962) (emphasis added).
35. Crimes that require a particular result are "result-oriented" crimes. Typi-
cally this label covers homicides and assault since part of their statutory require-
ments are that they cause death or injury. Crimes whose elements are solely
prohibited acts, such as robbery, which prohibits forcible takings, or burglary,
which prohibits breaking and entry, are not result-oriented crimes.
36. Section 2.06(4) of the Model Penal Code states that:
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the
commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if
any, with respect to that result, that is sufficient for the commission of
the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The Model Penal Code's general accomplice liability section has been adopted by
at least 25 jurisdictions; however, not all the jurisdictions that have adopted a
Model Penal Code-based penal law have included this subsection. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-2 23 (1994); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-301 (West 1989); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 609.17 (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 562.041 (West 1979); OR.
REv. STAT. § 161.155 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-3 (Michie 1988).
Most commentators agree that section 2.06(4) explicitly endorses the view
that a person may be an accomplice to an unintended crime. See, e.g., LAFAVE
& SCOTr, supra note 5, at 585 n.105; Kadish, supra note 5, at 347; Robinson &
Grail, supra note 21, at 737. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text for a
description of the courts' treatment of this section.
37. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) commentary at 311 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962). The commentary to section 2.06 states that subsection (4) is most
relevant "where unanticipated results occur from conduct for which the actor is
responsible under Subsection (3)." Id. It adds:
One who solicits an end, or aids or agrees to aid in its achievement is
an accomplice in whatever means may be employed, insofar as they
constitute or commit an offense fairly envisaged in the purposes of the
association. But when a wholly different crime has been committed,
thus involving conduct not within the conscious objectives of the
accomplice, he is not liable for it unless the case falls within the specific
terms of Subsection (4).
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 311-13 (advocating the need for intent in
specifically different crimes).
A fair interpretation of the relationship between subsections (3) and (4) is
that once the state can establish that the secondary actor had the purpose to
promote or facilitate the commission of one particular offense, as required under
subsection (3), that actor will also be liable for additional, unplanned, result-
oriented crimes the principal commits as long as that actor possesses the mens
rea required by the crime for that result. As discussed infra Part III, many courts
and commentators have not viewed section 2.06(4) as limiting the natural and
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auto theft example because it is not a result-oriented crime. It does,
however, ameliorate the unfairness that previously existed in the
following situation: an accomplice aids a principal in committing an
assault by providing the principal with the victim's address and telling
the principal just to "rough up" the victim.38 If the principal instead
kills the victim during the assault, under the natural and probable
consequence doctrine the accomplice would be guilty of murder
simply upon proof of the foreseeability of the principal's actions. In
contrast, under the Model Penal Code approach, the accomplice
would be guilty of a homicide commensurate with his or her mens
rea.
In short, accomplice liability rests on intent. Thus, generally a
person is responsible for a crime when, intending to promote its
commission, that person renders aid to the principal. Although sub-
stantial disagreement exists over the meaning and extent of a secon-
dary actor's intent, courts fundamentally seek a sufficiently blame-
worthy link between the secondary actor and the crime.
II. HISTORY OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR UNINTENTIONAL
CRIMES
In addition to the issues discussed in Part I, the standard defini-
tion of accomplice liability also raises an issue of whether a person
can be an accomplice to a crime that requires a mental state less than
intent or knowledge. This question most commonly arises in connec-
tion with homicides that have resulted from some reckless or negli-
gent conduct. For example, improper use of an automobile-either
by drag-racing or by allowing one's car to be driven by an intoxicated
or unlicensed driver-serves as the factual predicate for the majority
of cases in which the issue arises.39 The issue also commonly occurs
with assaults that unintentionally result in death, ° although other fac-
tually distinct cases also give rise to the issue.4' Resolving whether
probable consequence doctrine. Instead, they have interpreted the section as ex-
panding an accomplice's liability for unintentional crimes.
3& See, e.g., People v. Luparello, 187 Cal. App. 3d 410, 231 Cal. Rptr. 832
(1987).
39. See, e.g., Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1926); People v.
Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 1961); State v. Etzweiler, 480 A.2d 870 (N.H.
1984); People v. Abbott, 445 N.Y.S.2d 344 (App. Div. 1981).
40. See, e.g., People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989); State v. Foster,
522 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1987); State v. Bridges, 604 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1992); People v. Gramaglia, 423 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div. 1979); Mendez v.
State, 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
41. See, e.g., State v. DiLorenzo, 83 A.2d 479 (Conn. 1951) (involving an ille-
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one may be an accomplice to an unintentional crime requires, at the
outset, a consideration of the various types of complicity statutes.
Legislation concerning the extent of accomplice liability falls
into three categories. The first category of statutes contains language
that predicates accomplice liability solely on the intent to aid in the
commission of a specific offense.42 For example, under Arizona law
an accomplice must act "with the intent to promote or faciliate the
commission of an offense., 43 This category most closely resembles a
common law view of accomplice liability.' Unlike some of the statu-
tory schemes discussed below, statutes in the first category do not
appear to provide for complicity for unintentional crimes.45
The second category of statutes are those patterned on the
Model Penal Code.4  Similar to statutes in the first category, the
Model Penal Code requires that the accomplice act with the intent to
promote or facilitate the commission of the offense.47 Notably, how-
ever, it further provides that for result-oriented crimes, an
"accomplice in the conduct causing such result" is culpable if he acts
with the requisite mens rea for that offense.4 Although the commen-
tary to the Model Penal Code notes that this provision allows
gal still operation that ignited and caused the death of two children); State v.
McVay, 132 A. 436 (R.I. 1926) (involving an explosion of a defective steamship
boiler that killed numerous passengers).
42. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23 (1994) ("the intent to promote or assist
the commission of the offense"); ALASKA STAT. § 11.16.110 (Michie 1996)
("intent to promote or facilitate the commission of an offense"); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-301 (West 1989) (holding same); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 271
(1995) (holding same); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-2-20(3) (Harrison 1994)
("[ilntentionally aids or abets in the commission of the crime"); 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/5-2 (West 1993) ("with the intent to promote or facilitate such commis-
sion [of an offense]"); Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.041 (1979) ("purpose of promoting
the commission of an offense").
43. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-301.
44. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23 commentary ("What this section does is
define complicity in clear, direct and explicit terms .... The test wil be whether
the accused [acted] with the intent to promote or assist the perpetration of an of-
fense .... ).
45. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., ARK. CODEANN. § 5-2-403 (Michie 1997); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 702-223 (Michie 1993); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 502.020 (Michie 1990); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 628:8 (1996).
47. See MODELPENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
4& Id. § 2.06(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). This Article considers statutes
that adopt the Model Penal Code scheme but leave out subsection (4) as part of
category one. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-2-23; ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-301;
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.05 (West 1987 & Supp. 1998); Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.041;
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.155 (1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-3-3 (Michie 1988).
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accomplice liability for unintentional crimes,49 some courts have re-
jected this view.'
The third category is a hybrid. Without differentiating between
crimes on the basis of whether they have a result element as in the
second category, category three statutes require only that the ac-
complice intentionally aid the principal's conduct and have the mens
rea required by the underlying crime. For example, New York Penal
Law section 20.00 states: "When one person engages in conduct
which constitutes an offense, another person is criminally liable for
such conduct when, acting with the mental culpability required for
the commission thereof, he solicits, requests, commands, importunes,
or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct."51 Courts
have ruled that this category covers unintentional crimes.'2
Over the years, the courts have treated the issue with mixed re-
sults and with little regard to statutory directives.53 Some cases hold
that a person cannot be an accomplice to an unintentional crime be-
cause one cannot, as a matter of logic, intend to commit an uninten-
tional crime. 4 Thus, in State v. Etzweiler,5 the Supreme Court of
49. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(4) (currently § 2.06(4)) commentary at 34
(Tentative Draft No. 1,1953).
50. See infra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
51. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 20.00 (McKinney 1998); accord CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-8 (West 1994).
52- See, e.g., People v. Flayhart, 536 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1988); People v. Gramaglia,
423 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3)
commentary at 322 n.71 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
53. For example, the Colorado complicity statute provides that one is respon-
sible as an accomplice only if he acts "with the intent to promote or facilitate the
commission of the offense," making no provision for a different standard for re-
sult-oriented crimes. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-603 (1986) (emphasis added). Nev-
ertheless, the Colorado courts have allowed accomplice liability for unintended
crimes, interpreting the Colorado complicity statute's language as requiring only
that the accomplice has the "intent to promote or facilitate the act or conduct of the
principal." People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo. 1989) (emphasis added).
The interpretation raises due process concerns. See infra note 89.
In contrast, although the New Hampshire and Arkansas complicity statutes
track the language of Model Penal Code section 2.06(4), courts in these states have
refused to allow accomplice liability for unintended crimes. See Fight v. State, 863
S.W.2d 800, 805 (Ark. 1993); State v. Etzweiler, 480 A.2d 870, 874-75 (N.H. 1984).
54. See Maughon v. State, 71 S.E. 922,926 (Ga. Ct. App. 1911).
Confusion in this area is due in part to the courts' failure to differentiate be-
tween the two types of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. Voluntary man-
slaughter is an intentional killing committed under extenuating circumstances, such
as sudden passion or extreme emotional disturbance. See LAFAvE & ScoT, supra
note 5, at 653. Early common law rules held that one could not be an accessory to
voluntary manslaughter because it was not a premeditated crime. See Young v.
State, 236 S.E.2d 586, 586-87 (Ga. 1977); Sams v. Commonwealth, 171 S.W.2d 989,
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New Hampshire dismissed an indictment that charged a defendant
with criminally negligent homicide for a death that occurred after the
defendant lent his car to a friend whom he knew to be intoxicated.
The court found that the New Hampshire criminally negligent homi-
cide statute requires that an actor be unaware of the risk of death his
conduct created.16 The accomplice liability statute, however, also re-
quires that the accomplice's acts be designed to aid the principal in
committing a crime.' Therefore, the court held that, as a matter of
law, a person may not be an accomplice to criminally negligent
homicide, because one cannot intentionally aid a principal in a crime
that the principal was unaware he or she was committing.58
993 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943); State v. O'Shields, 161 S.E. 692,693 (S.C. 1931). This rule
was due in part to the complicated categorization of accomplices and concomitant
procedural difficulties that existed at common law. See supra note 9. Notwith-
standing the abolition of these classifications, vestiges of common law precedent
barring the concept of an accomplice to manslaughter remain. See, e.g., State v.
McVay, 132 A. 436 (LI. 1926). Modem authority correctly holds that since volun-
tary manslaughter is an intent-based crime, no conceptual bar prevents finding one
to be an accomplice to it. See, e.g., Webb v. State, 696 So. 2d 295, 296 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1996); Thomas v. State, 510 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind. 1987); Commonwealth v.
Rosario-Hemandez, 666 A.2d 292,296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
The greatest confusion arises from the two branches of involuntary man-
slaughter. See infra notes 113-21 and accompanying text. In contrast to voluntary
manslaughter, no intent to kill exists with involuntary manslaughters. Instead, in-
voluntary manslaughter can take two forms: (1) unintended deaths that occur as a
result of a lawful act committed in a reckless manner; or (2) unintended deaths that
occur during the performance of an unlawful act. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE §
192 (West 1988) ("Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of three kinds.... Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act,
not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act.., in an unlawful
manner, or without due caution and circumspection."); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-3
(Harrison 1994); see generally LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 675-83 (discussing
the interpretation and limitation of Unlawful-Act Involuntary Manslaughter).
55. 480 A.2d 870 (N.H. 1984).
56. See id. at 874; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:3.
57. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 630:3. For a discussion of courts' interpreta-
tions of the accomplice statute, see infra notes 101-02 and 137-38.
58. See Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 874-75; see also Fight v. State, 863 S.W.2d 800,805
(Ark. 1993); State v. Gartland, 263 S.W. 165,170 (Mo. 1924).
The Etzweiler court left open the question of whether accomplice liability lies for
reckless crimes. Subsequently, in State v. Home, 480 A.2d 121 (N.H. 1984), the
court sent mixed signals on this question. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire
reversed an accomplice's conviction of second-degree assault, a crime requiring a
mental state of recklessness, because the indictment did not specifically allege that
defendant had "the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the of-
fense." Id. at 122 (citation omitted). The court's reasoning that, pursuant to Etz-
weller, the accomplice must intend to aid in the commission of the offense appears
to reject the applicability of accomplice liability for any unintentional crime. How-
ever, the Home court also noted that "the facts alleged could support a conviction
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Other cases reject accomplice liability when the secondary actor
is not in the presence of, or controlling, the principal's actions. Thus,
in People v. Marshall,9 the Supreme Court of Michigan held that a
car owner was not an accomplice to involuntary manslaughter for
lending his car to someone he knew was intoxicated because the
owner was at home in bed at the time of the fatal accident.' The
court reasoned that the killing "was not counselied by [the car
owner], accomplished by another acting jointly with him, nor did it
occur in the attempted achievement of some common enterprise." 1
On the other hand, many courts have found that a defendant can
be an accomplice to unintentional crimes, because, as one court
stated: "[O]ne who engages with others in a common purpose to
carry on an activity in a reckless manner or with wanton disregard for
the safety of others is guilty" of participating in the resulting death.6'
State v. McVay" is an early case that courts and commentators often
cite as the preeminent example of the application of accomplice li-
ability doctrine to unintentional crimes. In McVay, defendant Kelly,
an officer of a steamboat company, was indicted as an accessory be-
fore-the-fact to manslaughter based on criminal negligence. Kelly
had ordered the ship's captain, McVay, and the engineer, who were
upon re-indictment." Id. (citation ommitted). The court did not explain how to
reconcile this statement with its reliance on Etzweiler. See infra Part III for a pos-
sible analysis. See generally John S. Davis, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional
Crime: Etzweiler and Home Revisited, 30 N.H.B.J. 95 (Winter 1989) (discussing
whether one may be charged as an accomplice in connection with a criminal offense
committed unintentionally).
59. 106 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 1961).
60. See id. at 843.
61. Id- at 844. The court noted that "an entirely different case would be pre-
sented" had the owner been in the car and permitted the driver to proceed. Id. at
843. The presence of the car owner in the car or following closely behind has been
a critical factor in the courts' determinations that the owner may be held as an ac-
complice to involuntary manslaughter. See, e.g., Story v. United States, 16 F.2d 342,
344 (D.C. Cir. 1926); Lewis v. State, 251 S.W.2d 490, 493 (Ark. 1952); State v.
Satem, 516 N.W.2d 839,844 (Iowa 1994).
The courts have not explicitly explained the significance of the owner's pres-
ence, but it appears to be based on a sense that the owner is ratifying or condoning
the specific acts of principal when he allows him to drive while intoxicated in the
owner's presence. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 348-49 n.50. Whether this rationale
is appropriate for the imposition of accomplice liability is explored infra Part Hm.
62. State v. DiLorenzo, 83 A.2d 479, 481 (Conn. 1951); accord, e.g., Stacy v.
State, 306 S.W.2d 852,854 (Ark. 1957); People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo.
1989)(en banc); State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277,282 (Conn. 1987); People v. Pitts, 270
N.W.2d 482, 484 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978); People v. Gramaglia, 423 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80
(App. Div. 1979); Commonwealth v. Bridges, 381 A.2d 125,128 (Pa. 1977); Mendez
v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36,37-38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
63. 132 A. 436 (RI. 1926).
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indicted as principals, to fire up the ship's boiler although he knew
the boiler was old and unsafe. The boiler exploded, killing many of
the passengers. Kelly demurred to the indictment that charged him
with "maliciously" aiding and inciting the manslaughter on the
ground that he could not, as a matter of law, be an accomplice since
involuntary manslaughter is an unintentional crime."
The court rejected defendant's contention. It first delineated the
various types of manslaughter: sudden heat or passion; unlawful act
resulting in an unintentional killing; and lawful act committed with
gross negligence that results in death.' It reasoned that "[t]here is no
inherent reason why, prior to the commission of [involuntary man-
slaughter] one may not aid, abet, counsel, command, or procure the
doing of the unlawful act or of the lawful act in a negligent manner. "
6
Applying this reasoning, the court ruled that the defendant could be
charged with counseling and procuring the principals to disregard
their duties and negligently create steam.67
The majority of recent cases has followed McVay's reasoning
and has permitted accomplice liability for unintentional crimes.'
Rather than insisting that the accomplice intend to promote the
commission of an offense, these courts require only that the accom-
plice intend to aid the principal in the acts that unintentionally result
in death.69 For example, in People v. Turner,70 defendant was con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter as an aider and abettor for giving
guns to two acquaintances and directing them to settle their dispute
in a "trial by battle."'" Defendant asserted on appeal that since intent
64. See id. at 437-39.
65. See id. at 437-38. The court correctly distinguished between voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter. See supra note 54. However, its statement that one can-
not be an accessory to voluntary manslaughter, while reflective of the early law on
accomplice liability, see supra note 54, is no longer correct. See, e.g., Webb v. State,
696 So. 2d 295 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996); Thomas v. State, 510 N.E.2d 651 (Ind. 1987);
Rainey v. State, 572 N.E.2d 517 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (person may be accessory to
voluntary manslaughter because, while the accessory may not share or contribute to
the sudden heat present in the mind of the principal, the accessory may readily con-
tribute to the homicide knowing that the principal is acting under sudden heat);
Commonwealth v. Rosario-Hemandez, 666 A.2d 292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995).
66. McVay, 132 A. at 438.
67. See id. at 439.
68. See supra note 65.
69. See, e.g., State v. DiLorenzo, 83 A.2d 479 (Conn. 1951); State v. Travis, 497
N.W.2d 905 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993); People v. Gramaglia, 423 N.Y.S.2d 78 (App. Div.
1979).
70. 336 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
71. Id. at 218.
1368
June 1998] ACCOMPLICE LIABILITYAND INTENT
was not an element of involuntary manslaughter, he could not, as a
matter of law, be an accomplice. In rejecting defendant's contention,
the appellate court reasoned that even though the defendant did not
intend that the principal kill the victim, he was responsible because
he intended the very act that led to death-the pointing of a loaded
gun at the victim.'
Most commentators approve of the result in McVay.73 Professor
Kadish notes that there is nothing doctrinally improper in permitting
accomplice liability for unintentional offenses since the "requirement
of intention for complicity liability is satisfied by the intention of the
secondary party to help or influence the primary party to commit the
act that resulted in the harm." 74 He cautions, however, that accom-
plice liability for unintentional crimes should be narrowly confined to
situations where the accomplice intentionally promotes the particular
act that causes the unintended result.'
In stark contrast, Professors LaFave and Scott reject entirely the
suitability of accomplice doctrine for unintentional crimes.76 They
note that accomplice liability doctrine is most needed for crimes that
prohibit specific culpable conduct, rather than for crimes that penal-
ize an actor for causing an undesirable result.' In the latter situation,
Professors LaFave and Scott favor assessing an actor's culpability di-
rectly and limiting liability to cases where the actor is the legal cause
of harm. They raise concerns that employing complicity rules could
improperly impose liability on remote or insignificant forms of assis-
tance.
78
72 See id. at 219.
73. See Dressler, supra note 5, at 138; Kadish, supra note 5, at 347; Mueller, su-
pra note 18, at 2190. But see LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5, at 585-86.
74. Kadish, supra note 5, at 347.
75. See id at 348. Kadish states in pertinent part:
It is important to distinguish these [McVay-type] cases from those in
which the criminal liability of the principal arises from actions that go
beyond those that the accomplice intended .... So, for example, a de-
fendant who lends his car keys to a driver he knows to have just had
several drinks is an accomplice to the driver's crime of driving under the
influence of alcohol. But strictly, he would not be liable for manslaugh-
ter as an accomplice of the driver if the driver's liability arises out of
particular acts of reckless driving-for example, driving in the wrong di-
rection on an expressway and colliding with an oncoming vehicle-that
the defendant did not intend.
Id. The significance of this distinction is extensively discussed infra Part M.
76. See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 5, at 584-86.
77. See id. at 585-86.
78. See id. Under general principles of causation, a person is the cause of death
when he meets two requirements. See id. at 277. He must be the actual or but-for
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Notwithstanding scholarly admonitions, a number of courts have
upheld the imposition of accomplice liability in situations far beyond
cause of death, and he must be the legal or proximate cause of death. See generally
id. at 277-83 (stating that it must be determined that the defendant's conduct was
the cause in fact or result, and once cause in fact is established, it must be deter-
mined that any variation between the result intended and the result achieved is not
so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the defendant responsible). Under
the first prong, most courts hold that a person need not be the sole actual cause of
death, rather he need only be a "substantial factor" in the victim's death. See id. at
279-81. Under the second prong, legal cause is typically measured in terms of
whether the result is foreseeable. See id. at 281-83.
Professors LaFave and Scott's position that utilizing causation principles
rather than accomplice doctrine will better protect defendants from excessive pun-
ishment may be unfounded. Although traditional causation provided that the inter-
vening act of an individual may break the chain of causation between a secondary
actor and the ultimate harm, a number of courts have modified this strict view of
free will and have held that the existence of another actor should not, per se, elimi-
nate the possibility of direct liability, particularly where the primary actor's ability
to act freely is compromised. Compare People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27, 30
(Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (stating that the defendant could not cause the death of an
individual whom the defendant encouraged to commit suicide), with State v. Marti,
290 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1980) (stating that the victim's act of shooting herself
did not preclude defendant's culpability in causing her death). By analogy, one
could argue that where an owner of a car provides alcohol or drugs to another and
then gives him the keys to his car, the driver's actions do not break the causal chain
of responsibility. Thus, while accomplice liability may not be appropriate because
the owner does not intend the principal's specific deadly acts, courts could find that
the owner was a direct cause of death. For example, in United States v. Brown, 22
M.J. 448, 449 (C.M.A. 1986), defendant allowed a drunk acquaintance to drive his
car. The defendant, who was not in the car at the time it was involved in a fatal ac-
cident, was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. See id. In upholding defen-
dant's conviction, the Court of Military Appeals noted that it need not address
whether defendant was an accomplice of the negligent driver because his actions in
lending his car to an intoxicated driver was itself culpable and a proximate cause of
death. See id.
Even when the principal's actions are wholly volitional, a significant number
of courts have adapted their causation rules to extend liability beyond the principal
actor. For example, courts have had little difficulty in imposing direct liability
against a parent for failing to act to prevent a third party from inflicting injury to his
or her child. See, e.g., State v. Austin, 172 N.W.2d 284 (S.D. 1969); see generally
Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. REv. 95 (1993)
(discussing the meaning of motherhood as enforced by the criminal law's treatment
of mothers who abuse or fail to protect their children). Similarly, in a number of
drag-racing cases courts have imposed direct liability against a participant in a drag
race where death was caused by a co-participant. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 184 So.
2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); State v. McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608 (Iowa 1982).
Some courts appear to be modifying traditional causation principles to punish
secondary actors. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 399-400. The danger of over-
punishment may, in fact, be heightened if courts use causation principles to assess
culpability because, as one court stated, accomplice liability is based on concepts of
intent, whereas causation is based on concepts of foreseeability. See McFadden,
320 N.W.2d at 613.
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McVay." For example, in People v. Wheeler,'° the defendant was
convicted of criminally negligent homicide as an accomplice." The
defendant got into a fight with the victim, who lived in the same
apartment complex as the defendant. The defendant's common-law
husband, Anderson, walked in while they were fighting, and he also
began fighting with the victim. The fight subsided, and the victim re-
turned to his apartment. Some time later, Anderson went to the vic-
tim's apartment with a knife and resumed the fight, stating that he
was going to kill the victim. The defendant had followed Anderson
up to the apartment and while he was fighting with the victim, she
jumped on the victim's back and pulled his hair. The victim died
from a stab wound that Anderson inflicted in his side.'
At trial, a witness testified that the defendant was not trying to
help Anderson stab the victim. The trial court set aside the jury
conviction on the grounds that it was logically impossible to assist
another in the commission of acts that the principal does not have the
intent to commit.' The Supreme Court of Colorado reinstated the
conviction, reasoning that all that is required for complicity culpabil-
ity is that the secondary actor know that the principal is engaging in
criminal conduct, that she aid or abet the principal in that conduct,
and that death occur.'
The difficulty with Wheeler is that the court did not specify what
the defendant did to aid the principal, although one can infer that it
was defendant's general participation in the assault that formed the
basis of her aid. It therefore appears that the court imposed accom-
plice liability upon the defendant when proof was lacking that she in-
tended to aid in the principal's specific harmful act of stabbing the
victim.
As this section has described, legislative, judicial, and scholarly
treatment of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes has been
decidedly conflicting. Some statutes state that accomplice liability is
predicated on intent to aid in the commission of an offense. Accord-
ingly, some courts reason that complicity exists only for intent-based
crimes. Other jurisdictions find the necessary intent by focusing on
79. See, e.g., Chance v. State, 685 A.2d 351 (Del. 1996); People v. Cole, 625
N.E.2d 816 (Il. App. Ct. 1993); State v. Satem, 516 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1994).
80. 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989) (en banc).
81. See id. at 101.
82. See iL
83. See id.
84. See id at 105.
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whether the secondary actor intended to aid the specific conduct
producing the culpable harm and therefore permit accomplice liabil-
ity for crimes that require only recklessness or negligence. Still other
jurisdictions impose accomplice liability without detailing the secon-
dary actor's role in aiding the principal in producing the unintended
harm. The propriety of these legislative and judicial approaches is
analyzed in Part III.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY FOR
UNINTENTIONAL CRIMES
The proper test of accomplice liability is founded on intent, re-
gardless of whether the crime itself is intentional. With intentional
crimes, the accomplice's intent is established by showing that the ac-
complice acted with the intent that the offense be committed. There
is no need to delineate whether the secondary actor intended to aid
the principal's acts or the results of those acts." What differs in as-
sessing accomplice liability for unintentional crimes is that we can no
longer evaluate the secondary actor's culpability by simply asking
whether the actor intended to aid in the commission of the offense.
Instead, the proper test of the secondary actor's culpability should
measure whether the actor intended to aid the commission of the
particular acts which led to the unintentional harm. As noted by Pro-
fessor Kadish, this test does not change the intent requirement of ac-
complice liability doctrine; it merely reflects a fine-tuning necessi-
tated by the unintentional nature of some crimes."
A. Legislative Variations
The mixed views of courts on whether a person can be an ac-
complice to an unintentional crime are due, to a great extent, to a
misapprehension of accomplice liability's intent requirement. This
misapprehension is due in part to legislative failure to adequately de-
lineate the scope of accomplice liability for intentional and uninten-
tional crimes.' For example, Category One complicity statutes re-
quire that a person act with the intent to assist in the commission of
an offense. Such language appears to preclude accomplice liability
for unintentional crimes because its language presupposes awareness
85. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
86. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 347.
87. See supra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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of the intended crime. No principled reason exists for banning ac-
complice liability for unintentional crimes since, if properly focused,
no doctrinal change is implicated by permitting accomplice liability
for unintentional crimes. One could argue, however, that the plain
language of the statutes does not permit accomplice liability for unin-
tentional crimes and that courts do not have the ability to go beyond
the plain meaning of the statute. 9
At least one court has so held. In Echols v. State,9 the Court of
Appeals of Alaska ruled that a defendant could not be an accomplice
to an unintentional crime based on the plain language of the Alaska
complicity statute that required the secondary actor to act with the
"intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense."'" The
court further reasoned that the statute's legislative history indicated
that it was meant to codify Alaska common law which limited ac-
complice liability to specific intent crimes.9 As discussed below, the
89. Constitutional rules of due process mandate that a defendant is entitled to
fair notice of what the law prohibits. See United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219,
1224-25 (1997); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (quoting McBoyle
v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)); State v. Goodwin, 813 P.2d 953, 967
(Mont. 1991). Additionally, the canons of statutory construction state that criminal
statutes be narrowly construed. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 105
(1945); State v. Pardo, 712 P.2d 737, 740 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985); State v. Ahitow, 544
N.W.2d 270,273 (Iowa 1996).
90. 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991); accord People v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d
842 (Mich. 1961). The Marshall court indicated that finding an owner of a vehicle
guilty as an accomplice to involuntary manslaughter when he was not with the
driver at the time of the accident would be unconstitutional. See Marshall, 106
N.W.2d at 844; see also LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 586 (discussing that ac-
complice liability theory is required to impose liability* of persons who did not
themselves engage in the unlawful conduct).
91. Echols, 818 P.2d at 692 (emphasis omitted).
92. See id. On a similar issue, some courts have held that a person may not at-
tempt an unintentional crime. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 377 N.E.2d 28 (III. 1978);
State v. Zupetz, 322 N.W.2d 730 (Minn. 1982); State v. Hembd, 643 P.2d 567 (Mont.
1982); People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.S. 2d 602 (1988); People v. Burress, 505 N.Y.S.
2d 272 (App. Div. 1986); State v. Smith, 534 P.2d 1180 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); State v.
Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Dunbar, 817 P.2d 1360 (Wash.
1991). But see infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. These courts have prem-
ised their analysis on the plain language of their jurisdictions' attempt statutes,
which require that the actor act with "the intent to commit a specific offense."
Harris, 377 N.E.2d at 31 (quoting ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., 38/8-4(2) (West 1977)).
They reason that it is inherently contradictory to attempt the unintended. These
cases are germane because of the similarities between the language of the attempt
statutes and Category One accomplice statutes. Accordingly, courts in Category
One jurisdictions could rule that accomplice liability does not extend to uninten-
tional crimes because their accomplice statutes require that one intend to aid in the
commission of an offense.
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Echols court decision is illustrative of an excessively narrow view of
accomplice liability's intent requirement, which we can trace directly
to the wording of the complicity statute. 3
Category Two statutes, 94 which fully adopt Model Penal Code
section 2.06, also do not adequately address the scope of accomplice
liability for unintentional crimes. The intent of the drafters of the
Model Penal Code was to create a statute that would specifically al-
low accomplice liability for unintentional crimes.95 The outcome was
section 2.06. In addition to requiring that an accomplice have the in-
tent to "promot[e] or facilitat[e] the commission of an offense,"96 the
Model Penal Code specifies that for result-oriented crimes "an ac-
complice in the conduct causing such [a] result is an accomplice in the
commission of that offense," if he meets the mens rea requirement of
the underlying crime?
An ambiguity exists between two subsections of section 2.06.
Section 2.06(4) uses the term "an accomplice in the conduct" without
defining what the term means or whether it overrides the require-
ment of section 2.06(3) that the secondary actor intend to promote or
facilitate the commission of a specific offense." The drafters of the
93. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
96. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
97. Id. § 2.06(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
98. Tentative Draft No. 1 of Model Penal Code 2.04(4), which was renumbered
as 2.06(4) in the final version of the Code, stated the following:
When causing a particular result is an element of a crime, a person is
an accomplice in that crime if:
(a) he was an accomplice in behavior causing such result; and
(b) he shared such purpose or knowledge with respect to that
result as may be required by the definition of the crime.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(4) (Tentative Draft No. 1,1953) (emphasis added).
The commentary to this version states that "[t]his paragraph makes clear that
complicity in conduct causing a particular criminal result entails accountability for
that result so long as the accomplice shared the purpose or the knowledge with re-
spect to the result that is demanded by the definition of the crime." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.04(4) commentary at 34 (Tentative Draft No. 1,1953) (emphasis added).
Although a fair reading of the caveat is that the drafters of the Code did not intend
that one could be an accomplice to an unintentional crime, in support of this sec-
tion, the commentary states that a passenger who urges a driver to increase speed
would be just as culpable as the driver if death or injury occurred. See id. This ex-
ample makes clear that the drafters supported the idea of accomplice liability for
unintended crimes.
The next revision of the complicity section changed the language of subsec-
tion 4 to the following:
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Model Penal Code could have meant that for result-oriented crimes, a
person need only intend to promote the perpetrator's conduct rather
than intend to promote the commission of the offense." This inter-
pretation, however, is subject to dispute and has already been re-
jected by two jurisdictions.O While on the bench of the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire, Justice David Souter stated that the lan-
guage used in 2.06 failed to make the relationship between subsec-
tions (3) and (4) clear."0' Souter opined that New Hampshire's Model
Penal Code-based complicity statute was constitutionally infirm be-
cause, in failing to define what was an "'accomplice in the conduct,"'
the statute failed "to give any comprehensible, let alone fair, notice
of its intended effect."''
When causing a particular result is a material element of an
offense, a person is an accomplice in the commission of that offense if:
(a) he was an accomplice in conduct causing such result; and
(b) he acted with the kind of culpability with respect to that result
that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (Tentative Draft No. 4,1955).
The drafters of the Code do not explain the change in terminology from
"crime" to "offense" and "behavior" to "conduct" other than to state generally that
"[v]erbal changes have been made by the Reporter to conform to style of other
sections." Id. § 2.06.
The comments to the final version of 2.06 states that it was presented to the
Institute in the Proposed Official Draft and approved at the May 1962 meeting.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 commentary at 295 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
No explanation is given for the changes between Tentative Draft No. 4 and the final
version.
The version of section 2.06 included in Tentative Draft No. 4 more clearly
states the parameters of accomplice liability for result-oriented crimes, and by ex-
tension for unintentional crimes based on recklessness and negligence, than does
the final version of 2.06. First, it states more clearly that one may be an accomplice
to a result-oriented crime when he is an accomplice in conduct. Second, because it
tracks the language of subsection 3 with respect to defining when one is an accom-
plice in the commission of an offense, the apparent ambiguity between subsections
3 and 4 is eliminated.
99. See, e.g., State v. Bridges, 604 A.2d 131 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); see
generally Davis, supra note 58, at 99-102 (discussing whether one can be charged as
an accomplice to a crime the principal committed unintentionally).
100. See Fight v. State, 863 S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Ark. 1993); State v. Etzweiler,
480 A.2d 870,874 (N.H. 1984).
101. See Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 876 (Souter, J., concurring specially).
102. Id. at 876-77 (Souter, J., concurring specially); see also State v. Home, 480
A.2d 121, 122 (N.H. 1984) (Souter, J., concurring specially) (holding that improper
indictment of the defendant by the state warranted a reversal of his conviction).
Another problem exists with Model Penal Code section 2.06(4). Its drafters
explained that its purpose was two-fold. First, it was created to limit the "natural
and probable consequence" doctrine. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Second, as described above, the drafters of the Model Penal Code wanted to extend
accomplice liability to unintentional crimes. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 coin-
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One can argue that Category One and Two statutes provide
adequate notice because it is within the courts' interpretive powers to
examine the term "offense" as used in these statutes and rule that it
extends to unintentional offenses.1 Nevertheless, since some juris-
dictions have ruled otherwise, a sounder approach entails revamping
unclear statutes to specify whether a person can be an accomplice to
an unintentional crime. Patterning accomplice statutes after Cate-
gory Three statutes.. will help to avoid notice and ambiguity prob-
lems. These statutes specify that the gravamen of accomplice liability
is intentionally aiding in the principal's conduct and possessing the
mental culpability required by the underlying crime. Courts inter-
preting Category Three statutes have had little difficulty imposing
accomplice liability for unintentional crimes."' Even in Category
Three jurisdictions, however, courts must carefully evaluate whether
the secondary actor's intent was directed to the specific conduct
causing harm.
mentary at 312 n.42, 321-22 n.71; see also id. § 2.04 commentary at 34 (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 1953). However, drafting one general statute, section 2.06(4), to ad-
dress competing goals was unwise because it fails to use language specific to each
situation. Thus, it is unclear exactly what section 2.06(4) covers. Looking to legis-
lative history to ascertain the drafters' intent, when they intended competing goals
is unhelpful since on the one hand, the section could be viewed as trying to limit ac-
complice liability and on the other hand one can find language showing that liability
is to be extended. Compare Davis, supra note 58, at 97 ("Subsection IV [a state
corollary to 2.06(4)] broadens the scope of accomplice liability."), with Common-
wealth v. Bridges, 381 A.2d 125, 127 (Pa. 1977) ("Subsection (d) of 306 [the state
corollary to 2.06] ... limits the culpability of accomplices.").
103. In fact, many courts have examined whether a person can be an accomplice
to an unintentional crime, notwithstanding legislative language that suggests oth-
erwise. See Weidler v. State, 624 So. 2d 1090, 1091 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993); People
v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo. 1989); State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277, 283
(Conn. 1987). However, since some courts in jurisdictions with Category Two ac-
complice statutes have ruled that they do not have the power to extend accomplice
liability to unintentional crimes, the issue remains uncertain. See Fight v. State, 863
S.W.2d 800, 802-03 (Ark. 1993); State v. Etzweiler, 480 A.2d 870, 874 (N.H. 1984).
104. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., People v. Flayhart, 533 N.E.2d 657 (N.Y. 1988). In Flayhart, de-
fendants, who were charged as accomplices to criminally negligent homicides,
claimed that the New York accomplice statute required a secondary actor to inten-
tionally aid the principal to "'fail to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk' of
death," and that this was logically impossible. ld. at [need page]. The New York
Court of Appeals rejected this construction of section 20.00, stating:
Penal Law § 20.00 imposes accessorial liability on an accomplice not
for aiding or encouraging another to reach a particular mental state,
but rather for intentionally aiding another to engage in conduct which
constitutes the charged offense while himself 'acting with the mental
culpability required for the commission' of that offense.
Id.; accord State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1987).
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Some courts are unnecessarily restrictive, while others go be-
yond the proper reaches of accomplice liability whether because of
unartfully phrased accomplice statutes or independent judicial mis-
apprehension of the proper focus of accomplice liability's intent re-
quirement. The following subsections discuss judicial treatment of
this issue.
B. Overextension of Accomplice Doctrine
In comporting with a refined definition of accomplice liability's
intent requirement that focuses on the actor's intent to promote or
facilitate the principal's acts, courts should adhere to other aspects of
traditional accomplice rules, specifically the rejection of the natural
and probable consequence doctrine.3 ' Additionally, they must dis-
tinguish between accomplice liability based on the commission of an
unlawful act from accomplice liability based on the commission of a
lawful act in a reckless or negligent manner. Finally, courts should
reject knowledge as the requisite mens rea in favor of intent to pro-
mote the principal's conduct. Some courts have failed to do so, and
the result has been an unwarranted expansion of accomplice liability
doctrine.
1. The natural and probable consequence doctrine
In examining whether the secondary actor meets the intent re-
quirements of accomplice rules for unintentional crimes, courts must
differentiate between acts that the accomplice intends to aid and
those that are merely a foreseeable consequence of the aid; only the
former should lead to liability. This rule parallels the analysis of the
extent of a secondary actor's culpability when intending to aid the
commission of a specific crime but the principal commits crimes be-
yond what the secondary actor intended. In such a case, commenta-
tors overwhelmingly reject the natural and probable consequence
doctrine which would extend accomplice liability to those offenses
that are merely foreseeable.10 Analogously, when assessing accom-
plice liability for crimes based on recklessness or negligence, courts
should limit liability to those acts the accomplice intended to pro-
mote.
106. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. But see supra note 31 and ac-
companying text.
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Limiting liability makes sense because a distinction exists be-
tween situations where the secondary actor actively encourages the
principal to engage in specific conduct that causes the unintended
harm, such as in McVay or the speeding-to-the-airport scenario, from
instances where the secondary actor intends that the principal engage
in reckless behavior but does direct the specific act that causes harm,
such as many of the drag-racing and assault cases. Accomplice liabil-
ity should not apply in the latter situations because the principal's
culpability stems from conduct that differs or exceeds what the ac-
complice intended, albeit that the principal's acts may be foresee-
able. o' Yet some jurisdictions have extended accomplice liability to
just these types of situations under a general finding that the in-
tended aid resulted in foreseeable acts.'O'
In the Wheeler assault case, there was no evidence that the de-
fendant intended to aid her common-law husband's specific act of
stabbing the victim.1 At best, one could argue that she intended to
aid in his fight with the victim and the stabbing was a natural and
probable consequence of the initial fight. Similarly, in the drag rac-
ing cases, the secondary actor intends only to promote the act of
driving at high speeds. Although it may be foreseeable to the secon-
dary actor that his adversary may drive erratically by swerving
around and passing other cars, one cannot say that the secondary
party intended those specific acts. The courts should find that this
lack of intent precludes the imposition of accomplice liability should
a death result from the drag race."' Cases that impose accomplice
108. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 348. Professor Kadish gives as an example the
situation where a person gives his car keys to an intoxicated individual. Kadish
would hold the car owner only guilty of being an accomplice to the crime of driving
under the influence of alcohol. He would not find the secondary party guilty of in-
voluntary manslaughter for the particular acts of reckless driving such as driving
over a median that the accomplice did not intend because, while these acts may be
probable or foreseeable, they are not what the accomplice intended. See id.
109. See Simmons v. State, 649 So. 2d 1282 (Ala. 1994) (holding that defendant
who shot into crowded street could be convicted of reckless murder as an accom-
plice based on his knowledge that the principal was engaging in reckless conduct
and his intentional assistance and encouragement thereof); State v. Garza, 916 P.2d
9 (Kan. 1996) (holding that where defendant and another were engaged in a gun-
fight, defendant could be properly convicted of murder of bystander under the the-
ory of accomplice liability although he did not fire the fatal shot because the two
were acting in concert as to bystanders and the defendant's participation could be
considered encouragement); People v. Abbott, 84 A.D.2d 11 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)
(drag-racing participant was guilty in death of bystander).
110. See People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101, 103 (Colo. 1989).
111. Where the victim is a co-participant, accomplice liability is precluded be-
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liability for unintentional crimes upon a generalized finding that the
principal's acts were foreseeable violate the rejection of the natural
and probable consequence doctrine and are unwarranted extensions
of accomplice liability. The danger of the imposition lies in the risk
of punishing a person who does not possess the requisite intent.
m
Since the natural and probable consequence doctrine flouts the most
fundamental tenet of criminal law that punishment be based on
blameworthiness, courts should be especially mindful of it when as-
sessing accomplice liability for unintentional crimes.
2. Misdemeanor-manslaughter rule
Involuntary manslaughter can take two forms: (1) unintended
deaths that occur as a result of a lawful act committed in a reckless or
negligent manner; or (2) unintended deaths that occur during the
commission of an unlawful act."' Historically, lawmakers and com-
mentators have referred to the latter as misdemeanor-manslaughters.
Under this rule, a person who commits an unlawful act is responsible
for a death that occurs in its commission, without regard to a culpable
mental state with respect to the death.14 Commentators who view
the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine as a junior version of the
felony-murder rule have leveled the same harsh criticism against
cause homicide statutes typically call for causing the death "of another." State v.
McFadden, 320 N.W.2d 608, 610 (Iowa 1982). Some courts have applied a causa-
tion analysis to this type of situation and have ruled that the surviving racer is liable
because it is foreseeable that a death would occur. See id. at 610-14 (stressing that
causation is based on concepts of foreseeability, whereas accomplice liability is
based on concepts of intent). But see Commonwealth v. Root, 170 A.2d 310, 314
(Pa. 1961).
Courts have been more willing to impose both direct and derivative liability
against a drag-racer when the death is of a non-participant. See McFadden, 320
N.W.2d at 610; Abbott, 445 N.Y.S. at 347.
112. Some courts and commentators have stressed the danger of inappropriate
punishment. See, e.g., Jacobs v. State, 184 So. 2d 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(Carroll, J., dissenting); see generally Dressier, supra note 5, at 93 (suggesting that
accomplice liability rules may be unjust and not counter-utilitarian because they are
not tied to the doctrine of causation).
113. See supra note 54.
114. The unlawful act typically is a misdemeanor, although courts have held that
it can encompass civil wrongs and felonies that do not fall within the scope of fel-
ony-murder rules. See generally LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 5, at 675-76
(discussing the "Unlawful-Act Involuntary Manslaughter" rule and the vagueness
of the expression "Unlawful Act"). See also Martin R Gardner, The [Mens Real
Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present,
1993 UTAH L. REv. 635, 705-06 (discussing the versanti in re illicitae principle that
one who acts unlawfully should be held responsible for all the consequences of his
conduct).
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both-they impose punishment without regard to blame.1'5 The only
mens rea needed for misdemeanor-manslaughter is the mental state
required to commit the underlying crime. Consequently, a person
may be an accomplice to misdemeanor-manslaughter solely on proof
that he or she intended to aid another in the commission of the un-
derlying offense. 6
The misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine has a significant im-
pact on the issue of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes.
Professors LaFave and Scott note that the problem of whether a per-
son may be an accomplice to an involuntary manslaughter "does not
exist when the involuntary manslaughter is of the unlawful-act
type.""7 This is so because the secondary actor need not have any
mental state with regard to the death. Intentional aid in the commis-
sion of the predicate offense will suffice to impose liability for the re-
sulting death." Therefore, the entire issue of whether a person can
be an accomplice to an unintentional crime is side-stepped; liability
for the unintentional manslaughter is boot-strapped to liability for
the underlying misdemeanor.
Courts, however, sometimes fail to note the distinction between
the two types of involuntary manslaughter."9 For example, in Men-
dez v. State" the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas considered
whether a defendant could be an accomplice to involuntary man-
slaughter that resulted from a random shooting by the defendant's
companion. Although the court specified that "[t]he gist of our in-
voluntary manslaughter offense is reckless conduct," in affirming
115. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 commentary at 77.
116. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 5, at 584 n.102.
117. Id. at 584.
118. Id. at 585.
119. See, e.g., State v. Satem, 516 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1994); Wade v. State, 124
S.W.2d 710 (Tenn. 1939). But see State v. DiLorenzo, 83 A.2d 479 (Conn. 1951).
Part of the problem is based on judicial conflict as to whether lawful acts committed
recklessly may serve as the predicate "unlawful act." See LAFAvE & SCoTr, supra
note 5, at 676 n.13. Another problem is that some jurisdictions temper the misde-
meanor-manslaughter doctrine with rules that the actor is responsible only for
deaths that are a foreseeable consequence of the predicate misdemeanor. See id. at
676-77. Perhaps the best solution is to continue the trend of modem legislatures
and abolish misdemeanor- manslaughters, leaving involuntary manslaughter solely
for reckless or negligent homicides. Not only are misdemeanor-manslaughters in-
compatible with modem criminal law theory which imposes punishment based on
individual blameworthiness, (the problems noted here also lend support for its
abolition.)
120. 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
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defendant's conviction, the court relied extensively on.misdemeanor-
manslaughter cases.
21
This lack of judicial precision is troublesome because it can lead
to sloppiness in the courts' examination of the parameters of ac-
complice liability for unintentional crimes based on recklessness or
criminal negligence. Broad pronouncements that precedent exists for
holding that a person may be an accomplice to an involuntary man-
slaughter may cause some courts to take a superficial approach in
their examination of the scope and extent of such liability.'2 Courts
must be wary of relying on precedent that, in fact, is not on point be-
cause the issue involved a different type of involuntary manslaughter.
Instead, courts must take care to scrutinize the factual underpinnings
of a case to ensure that the secondary actor's liability is predicated on
his intent to aid in the specific harm-producing acts.
3. Knowledge v. purpose
As discussed in Part II, many jurisdictions reject knowledge as
an acceptable mens rea for accomplice liability. With specific intent
crimes, the secondary actor must do more than just have knowledge
of the offense that the primary actor is planning to commit; he must
have the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the of-
fense. The courts should apply a parallel mens rea requirement be-
fore imposing accomplice liability for unintentional crimes and re-
quire that the accomplice intend to promote the commission of the
culpable act. Against this backdrop, the holdings of cases that have
imposed accomplice liability upon car owners for their drivers' acts
are called into question.lu A classic scenario involves the automobile
owner who lends his or her car to a drunk driver. Under a strict mens
rea analysis, the owner has the intent that the principal drive, but
query whether the owner intends that the driver commit the specific
acts that cause the unintentional harm.' 4
121. 1d. at 37-38. The Mendez court relied on Wade v. State, 124 S.W.2d 710
(Tenn. 1939), and Black v. State, 133 N.E. 795 (Ohio 1921). In both cases liability
was predicated on aiding the commission of an unlawful act. See State v. Satern,
516 N.W.2d 839 (Iowa 1994) (holding defendant vicariously liable for the acts of his
friend with whom he had gone drinking and allowed to drive his truck).
122. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 336 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (citing
Mendez as support for principle that one can be an accomplice to involuntary man-
slaughter based on reckless conduct).
123. See supra note 39 and accompanying cases.
124. Interestingly, in People v. Marshall, 106 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 1961), where the
court refused to find a car owner to be an accomplice where he was home at the
time of the fatal accident, the court noted that the owner was guilty only of a statute
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The car owner cases are similar to the archetypal example of the
gun supplier selling a gun to someone whom the supplier knows is
planning to kill his or her spouse. The court in United States v. Peoni
ruled that knowledge was insufficient for accomplice liability." The
supplier would not be an accomplice to first-degree murder because
the supplier lacked the necessary intent to aid in the commission of
the offense. Yet is it not true that the supplier intended to sell the
principal the gun? Of course it was the supplier's conscious objective
to do so. The supplier is not an accomplice because the supplier did
not do so with the intent that the principal kill his or her spouse; at
best the supplier had knowledge of what the principal intended.
Therefore the gun supplier could only be guilty of criminal facilita-
tion. By analogy, the car supplier's liability should be similarly lim-
ited.' 2'
Some commentators have acknowledged that holding the secon-
dary actor as an accomplice to an unintentional crime does not vio-
late the Peoni principles because the accomplice is being held to the
same mens rea requirement as the principal actor and that it is not
unjust to punish the accomplice as a perpetrator." This may very
well be true, but it does not obviate the primary consideration that
that made it punishable for the owner of an automobile to "knowingly... permit it
to be driven by a person" who was intoxicated. Id. at 844 (emphasis added). One
may take this statement to mean that the owner acted only with knowledge rather
than the requisite intent for accomplice liability, and that this was a reason for ex-
culpating the defendant.
125. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
126. This is particularly so if the car owner is not in the car with the driver at the
time of the accident. Some courts have held that the owner's failure to stop the
driver is silent encouragement of the reckless behavior and therefore fulfills the
mens rea of accomplice liability. See Kadish, supra note 5, at 348 n.50.
Because courts have ruled that a secondary actor may be convicted of a dif-
ferent level of homicide than a primary actor, in the gun supplier situation, it ap-
pears possible that in jurisdictions whose accomplice statutes contain a section akin
to Model Penal Code section 2.06(4), the gun dealer could be guilty of an uninten-
tional homicide. This is because the dealer intended to aid in the commission of P's
act of purchasing the gun, and one assumes that the prosecutor could easily prove
the dealer was reckless as to the risk that the gun would be used to kill someone.
Such a finding has serious implications. First, because it holds the supplier respon-
sible for a form of homicide, it conflicts with the judicial rulings and legislative di-
rectives that accomplice liability not be based on a mens rea of knowledge, particu-
larly in the commercial setting. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
Second, it calls into question the hecessity of criminal facilitation statutes, which
were enacted as a means of imposing some sanction upon suppliers and providers.
Legislatures may need to take specific corrective action if this is not the result they
desire.
127. See LAFAVE & SCoTr, supra note 5, at 585.
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the secondary actor acts with intent to promote the specific act that
causes the harm.
C. Improperly Narrow Use of Intent
Some courts have ruled that, as a matter of law, it is logically im-
possible to intend to aid the principal in performing a reckless or
negligent crime.us For example, with unintentional homicides, these
courts reason that it is impossible to find that the secondary actor
"knew that the principal intended to perpetrate an unintentional
killing. 12 In fact, the intent element is satisfied if the accomplice has
the conscious objective that the principal perform certain specific acts
which are reckless or negligent. It is not necessary that the accom-
plice intend that the result occur any more than it is necessary that
the principal intend the result.
We can make an analogy to the law of reckless endangerment on
this point. A person is guilty of reckless endangerment when that
person "recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk
of serious physical injury to another person."m Courts have inter-
preted this language to mean that a person is liable for engaging in
conduct with a conscious awareness that a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk of harm existsu1 Moreover, a number of courts have found
defendants guilty of reckless endangerment as accomplices. 132 None
128. See, e.g., Fight v. State, 863 S.W.2d 800, 805 (Ark. 1993); State v. Etzweiler,
480 A.2d 870, 874 (N.H. 1984); People v. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1989); cf.
Echols v. State, 818 P.2d 691 (Alaska Ct. App. 1991) (reversing a conviction of first-
degree assault because the defendent merely acted recklessly, but did not intend for
her daughter to suffer serious injury from defendant's husband beating the daugh-
ter).
129. Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 105; see Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 874-75.
130. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.20 (McKinney 1987). Reckless endangerment stat-
utes were enacted to criminalize unintentional conduct that fell short of causing
harm to another. See N.Y. PENAL LAW ARTICLE 120 PRACTICE COMMENTARY at
126. Some courts have interpreted their jurisdictions' attempt statutes to allow a
crime of attempted reckless manslaughter. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 729 P.2d
972 (Colo. 1986) (en banc). Most courts and commentators have rejected this ap-
proach and hold that reckless conduct that does not result in harm is punishable
only under a reckless endangerment statute. See supra notes 84 and 121-22 and ac-
companying text on the parallels between attempted manslaughter and accomplice
to manslaughter.
131. See, e.g., Albrecht v. State, 658 A.2d 1122 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995); Raine-
salo v. P.A., 566 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1997); People v. Einaugler, 208 A.2d 946 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1994); Commonwealth v. Silay, 694 A.2d 1109 (Pa. Ct. 1997); State v.
Brooks, 658 A.2d 22 (Vt. 1995).
132. See, e.g., People v. Albritton, 629 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1995); cf. People v. Smith,
543 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1989) (holding the defendant not guilty based on insufficient evi-
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of these cases has questioned the applicability of accomplice liability
to the crimes of reckless endangerment. Implicit in these cases is the
finding that the person intended to engage in the conduct but was
reckless as to the risk of harm resulting therefrom.3 3 Analogously, in
assessing accomplice liability for unintentional homicides, courts
need only find that the secondary actor intended to have the principal
engage in reckless conduct, not that the secondary actor intended
that the result occur.
Similar reasoning has allowed some jurisdictions to find that one
may attempt to commit an unintentional crime. 34 The Supreme
Court of Colorado is the foremost proponent of this position. In a
series of cases, it has stressed that what is significant is the actor's in-
tent to engage in certain conduct rather than an intent to commit an
offense.1 35 This shift in focus away from the result has allowed the
Colorado courts to hold that even if a crime is unintentional, one may
take steps to attempt it.
136
The reasoning employed by the courts in an attempt and reckless
endangerment cases is instructive on what the courts' focus should be
in the accomplice arena. As these courts make clear, we can find that
the secondary actor possessed the requisite intent by focusing on the
dence that either he or his accomplice engaged in reckless conduct).
133. The finding of intentional conduct is not explicitly made because the grava-
men of the offense is the performance of the conduct with reckless disregard of the
risks. Intentional conduct in this sense is nothing more than voluntary behavior.
134. See State v. Galan, 658 P.2d 243 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Thomas, 729 P.2d
972.
135. See Thomas, 729 P.2d at 975; People v. Castro, 657 P.2d 932, 938 (Colo.
1983) (en bane); cf. Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101 (allowing accomplice liability for an unin-
tended crime).
The emphasis of the Colorado Supreme Court on the intent to perform the
culpable act is correct. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. However, this
Article takes issue with the extent of the Colorado court's reach. It has held that
one may be an accomplice to an unintentional crime by borrowing the reasoning
employed in the attempt cases. However, it has not focused on whether the secon-
dary actor intended to aid in the very act that results in harm. Accordingly, its ex-
tension of accomplice liability for unintended crimes is too broad.
136. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. As noted earlier, most courts
have found that it is illogical to attempt to commit an unintentional crime. See su-
pra note 92. An in-depth analysis of whether one can attempt to commit an unin-
tended crime is beyond the scope of this Article; however, it appears that the same
reasoning that allows one to be an accomplice to an unintended crime by focusing
on the intent to commit an act that may unintentionally result in harm can be used
in the attempt arena. See Wheeler, 772 P.2d 101. But see State v. Foster, 522 A.2d
277, 281 (Conn. 1987) (distinguishing accessory liability from attempt liability by
stating, in dicta, "persons cannot attempt or conspire to commit an offense that re-
quires an unintended result").
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conduct promoted rather than on the intent to cause a particular re-
sult. The harm engendered by an unnecessarily restrictive view of
the term "intent" is the failure to punish blameworthy conduct. This,
in turn, eliminates the potential for deterring others from promoting
culpable conduct.
Another improper ground for a court's refusal to apply an ac-
complice theory of liability to an unintentional crime is by making a
distinction between crimes based on recklessness from those based
on negligence, allowing accomplice liability only in the former."
These courts appear to base this categorization on the subjective
awareness of the risk involved. As the courts in one jurisdiction rea-
soned, as a matter of law, an accomplice cannot aid in a crime that
the principal was unaware that he was committing, although he could
aid in one where the principal was aware that a risk of harm existed.'38
Courts that use the presence or absence of subjective risk aware-
ness by the principal as the litmus test of whether accomplice liability
exists again improperly focus on the principal's state of mind. Proper
analysis should examine whether the secondary actor had the con-
scious objective to have the principal engage in an act, and whether
both the secondary actor and the perpetrator knew or should of
known of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that harm will result.
IV. CONCLUSION
The doctrinal components of accomplice liability do not neatly
address the issue of accomplice liability for unintentional crimes since
complicity rules typically require that one intend to aid in the com-
mission of a crime. Allowing accomplice liability for unintentional
crimes does not, however, involve an extension of accomplice doc-
trine, but merely merits a refocusing of its intent requirements away
from the results produced by the principal and toward the conduct
producing the result. Courts that have been imprecise in their appli-
cation of accomplice liability doctrine to unintentional crimes have
not refined the focus of their intent inquiry. This is due in part to the
inexact language of many complicity statutes and also because of a
misapprehension of the form and extent of complicity's intent re-
quirements. To comport with the protection offered by this stringent
137. See, e.g, Wheeler, 772 P.2d at 107 (Erickson, J., dissenting); State v. Etz-
weiler, 480 A.2d at 870, 875 (N.H. 1984).
138. See Etzweiler, 480 A.2d at 874.
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intent requirement, courts must ensure that they are neither overin-
elusive by allowing liability to rest on merely foreseeable or knowing
acts, nor underinclusive by improperly limiting accomplice liability to
intentional crimes.
